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Most educators in American public higher education vigorously embrace the goal of diversity for 
both faculty and students.  One approach frequently utilized is preferential programs for targeted 
minorities for both faculty employment and student admissions.  The Supreme Court has recently 
recognized that achieving a diverse student body in a public college or university is a sufficiently 
important interest to constitutionally justify implementation of a preferential admissions plan for 
minority students.  The unanswered issue explored in this article is whether diversity may similarly 
serve as a sufficient justification for preferential hiring of minority faculty candidates.  Also 
discussed are alternatives that institutions of higher learning may pursue in order to achieve faculty 





he Supreme Court has acknowledged that achieving diversity within the student body of a state public 
college, university, or system of higher education (university) is a compelling state interest that may 
justify preferential admissions for racial and ethnic minorities (minority or minorities) (Gratz v. 
Bollinger, 2003; Grutter v. Bollinger, 2003).  The unanswered and more complex constitutional issue addressed in this 
article is to determine when a university may adopt an affirmative action program that entails preferential hiring of 
minority faculty (minority faculty preference).  Central to this determination is whether achieving a diverse faculty is 
a sufficiently compelling state interest that may constitutionally empower a university to do so.   
 
PURPOSE AND NATURE OF MINORITY FACULTY PREFERENCES  
 
Purpose Of Minority Faculty Preferences 
 
 Minority faculty preferences typically seek to achieve one or more of the following diversity objectives: (1) 
rectifying an underrepresentation of minority faculty at a particular university that is the result of past and/or present 
discrimination, (2) achieving a critical mass, in other words, a diversity, of minority faculty at a university or within a 
specific unit of a university, and/or (3) enriching and broadening the educational experience of the students.  Whether 
any one or more of these state interests are constitutionally sufficient to justify a minority faculty preference is one of 
the primary questions addressed in this article. 
 
 A university generally has no constitutional duty to adopt a minority faculty preference in the absence of a 
court order to do so (City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 1989).  Many educators nevertheless zealously believe that 
extending preferential faculty employment opportunities to underrepresented minorities is both ethically mandated  
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Nature Of Minority Faculty Preferences 
 
 Minority faculty preferences often vary in their structure and goals (Eastern Oregon University, 2001; Wright 
State University, 1998).  Preferential mechanisms, for example, may take a variety of forms.  Sometimes they include 
assigning an undefined, noncontrolling ―plus‖ to the evaluations of applicants who are members of a targeted minority 
(Grutter v. Bollinger, 2003).  Another approach entails adding a fixed number of points to the composite evaluation 
score of targeted minority applicants (Gratz v. Bollinger, 2003).  In extreme and constitutionally suspect cases, the 
preference entails reserving employment consideration solely for applicants who are a targeted minority.  
 
 Minority faculty preference programs typically have one of two goals.  Some programs seek to eliminate 
minority faculty underrepresentation caused by past or present discrimination.  Alternatively, the goal of many such 
programs is to enhance the educational experience of students.   
 
Incidence Of Minority Faculty Preferences 
 
 It presently is difficult to ascertain the number or nature of minority faculty preferences in the United States.  
Few universities voluntarily make their programs publicly available, instead reserving them solely for personal 
inspection at the institution itself (Northern Arizona University, 2006).  Nonetheless, commentators and studies 
suggest that countless universities have adopted and continue to utilize such programs (Garry, 2004). 
 
EQUAL PROTECTION PARADOX OF MINORITY FACULTY PREFERENCES 
 
 The Supreme Court has declined to address the constitutionality of minority faculty preferences (University 
of Nevada v. Farmer, 1998).  It therefore is incumbent upon educators, commentators, and lower courts to discern the 
constitutional legitimacy of minority faculty preferences from myriad obfuscatory and contradictory Supreme Court 
opinions addressing equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.  The Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment provides:  
 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges 
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws (U.S. Const. 
Amend. IVX ¶ 1). 
 
 Minority faculty preferences pose an inexorable equal protection paradox.  A minority faculty preference 
uses preferential treatment to help minorities secure faculty positions and achieve equal economic opportunity 
promised by the Fourteenth Amendment (Fullilove v. Klutznick, 1980) while depriving white and nonpreferred 
minorities of this very equality.  The challenge is to discern when a university’s interest in having a diverse faculty is 
so compelling that it is justified under the Fourteenth Amendment to use race- and ethnic-conscious preferences.   
 
 One line of equal protection precedents addresses the constitutionality of state race- and ethnic-conscious 
economic affirmative action plans (employment affirmative action), such as public employment and public 
contracting (Kohlbek v. City of Omaha, 2006).  A second line of equal protection case law focuses on race- and 
ethnic-conscious public education admissions plans (education affirmative action) (Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 
1978).  While these two lines of equal protection jurisprudence ostensibly embrace the same analytical standard, strict 
scrutiny, they apply this standard quite differently.  Since minority faculty preferences involve considerations of both 
public employment and public education, it is necessary to reconcile these lines of equal protection jurisprudence in 
order to solve the equal protection dilemma posed by minority faculty preferences. 
 
 Following is data regarding the current demographic and economic state of faculty public employment in the 
United States.  This article then provides parallel equal protection analyses of employment and education affirmative 
action, together with an analysis of the standards that should be used to evaluate minority faculty preferences.  
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FACULTY EMPLOYMENT IN HIGHER EDUCATION 
 
 Public college and university faculty collectively represent a numerically significant and well-compensated 
profession, which many professionals aspire to join.  But this coveted profession is, and will remain, available to only 
a relatively select few.  This scarcity of opportunity only serves to make minority faculty preferences all the more 
controversial. 
 
Employment Of Faculty In Higher Education 
 
 In 2003 there were nearly 1.15 million full- or part-time faculty at public institutions of higher education 
(American Association of University Professors, 2006).  The forecast is for generally positive growth in faculty 
employment through 2014 (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2006).  Nevertheless, there is a nearly 30-year trend that 
suggests a continued, significant reduction in full-time tenure and full-time tenure-track faculty positions (American 
Association of University Professors, 2006), and ―competition will remain tight for tenure-track positions at 4-year 
colleges and universities….‖ (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2006). 
 
Demographics Of Faculty Employment In Higher Education 
 
 In Winter 2003-2004, minorities collectively comprised 15.6 percent of full-time faculty in degree-granting 
institutions in the United States (U.S. Department of Education, 2005).  Within this total, representation of specific 
minorities was as follows (U.S. Department of Education, 2005) (percentages rounded): Black, non-Hispanic was 5.2 
percent, Hispanic was 3.2 percent, Asian/Pacific Islander was 6.5 percent, and American Indian/Alaska Native was .5 
percent. 
 
 The proportion of minority faculty significantly varies according to faculty rank.  Total minority faculty 
representation, for example, ranged in the foregoing study from 11.8 percent for professors to 19 percent for assistant 
professors.  Representation of specific minorities also varied according to faculty rank.  Black faculty, for example, 
comprised only roughly 3.2 percent of professors and 6.2 percent of assistant professors. 
 
Economics Of Faculty Employment In Higher Education 
 
 The comparatively generous remuneration and benefits accorded faculty reinforces the importance of faculty 
employment in higher education for individual faculty members.   
 
 Faculty compensation varies according to numerous factors, such as rank, discipline, type of institution, 
geographical location, accreditation, and reputation of institution.  In a 2004-05 survey of full-time faculty, the 
American Association of University Professors (2006) found that the average salary was $91,548 for professors, 
$65,113 for associate professors, $54,571 for assistant professors, $39,899 for instructors, and $45,647 for lecturers. 
 
 A survey conducted by the United States Department of Labor (2005) shows that the average pay for full-
time professors is nearly two and one-half times that for state and local government workers.  The typically generous 
benefits attendant to faculty employment similarly exceeds those received in other occupations (U.S. Department of 
Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2006). 
 
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF EMPLOYMENT AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND EDUCATION 
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION  
 
 Employment and education affirmative action are among the most controversial issues in contemporary 
American society.  These preferential programs have experienced a constitutional roller coaster ride for decades.  
Further tumult is expected since the Supreme Court recently has agreed to hear during its 2006-07 term two appeals 
(Meredith v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 2006; Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School 
District No. 1, 2006) involving the contentious issue of race-based admissions in K-12 schools (CBS News, 2006).   
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Historical Overview Of Employment Affirmative Action. 
 
 Affirmative action in public employment had its genesis in the watershed civil rights cases of the 1950s and 
1960s, such as Brown v. Board of Education (1955), and the landmark civil rights acts of the 1960s, such as the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 (Fullinwider, R., 2005).  Commencing in the late 1960s and early 1970s, judicial orders, executive 
orders, federal legislation, and voluntary public and private preferential programs gave rise to myriad employment 
affirmative action. 
 
 Voluntary and involuntary employment affirmative action enjoyed considerable constitutional validation 
through the mid-1980s.  Federal programs of this nature flourished during this period premised on the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Fullilove v. Klutznick (1980).   
 
 The seminal Supreme Court decision in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. (1989) turned the constitutional 
tide turned against employment affirmative action.  The Court embraced strict scrutiny as the equal protection 
standard to constitutionally evaluate employment affirmative action.  As Justice Marshall (p. 757) observed in dissent 
in this case, the Supreme Court’s decision represented a "full-scale retreat from the Court's longstanding solicitude to 
race-conscious remedial efforts."  Employment affirmative action programs in the ensuing years to the present often 
have been abandoned, radically restructured, or stricken by courts as violative of the Fourteenth Amendment (Kohlbek 
v. City of Omaha, 2006).   Notwithstanding this retreat, some employment affirmative action have successfully 
navigated the equal protection challenge and survived.  (Jana-Rock Constr., Inc. v. New York State Dep't of Econ. 
Dev., 2006). 
 
Historical Overview Of Education Affirmative Action 
 
 The Fourteenth Amendment enacted in 1868 prohibited states from continuing to deny a public education to 
individuals because of their race or ethnicity.  Nearly a century later, the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of 
Education (1954) struck down segregationist school programs that existed in many states.  Title VI of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 went further and mandated equality in education for persons of all races and national origins. 
 
 While the law has long promised equality for all races and ethnicities in public education, realization of this 
promise has been slow in coming.  Studies indicate that many minorities still languish in inferior public K-12 schools 
and other educational programs. 
 
 The United States General Accounting Office (2002) reports in a 2000-01 study that 71.6 percent of African-
American children and 76.3 percent of Hispanic children attended a school in which minorities made up a majority of 
the student body (Frankenberg, Lee and Orfield, 2003).  Moreover, schools in predominantly minority communities 
have far fewer educational resources than in other communities (United States General Accounting Office, 2002).    
 
 In order to help overcome racial and ethnic disparity in public education, education affirmative action 
became commonplace during the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s.  These programs flourished under the 
constitutionally vague and permissive standards articulated by Justice Powell in his controlling opinion in Regents of 
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, (1978).   
 
 Commencing in the mid-1990s and continuing until 2003, the tide significantly turned against education 
affirmative action.  This reversal stemmed from a flurry of federal appellate court decisions that struck down a number 
of programs for education affirmative action on the ground that they violated the Fourteenth Amendment and its 
guarantee of equal protection (Doe v. Kamehamena Schools, 2005; Hopwood v. Texas, 1996).  The federal circuit 
courts in these cases held that diversity is not a compelling state interest and standing alone does not justify 
preferential admissions policies at universities.  Then in a stunning turnaround, the Supreme Court determined that 
achieving a diverse student body is a compelling state interest and justifies education affirmative action (Grutter v. 
Bollinger, 2003).   
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CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD FOR minority faculty preferences:  STRICT SCRUTINY 
 
 Largely overlooked in the arena of public affirmative action are minority faculty preferences.  Until the 
Supreme Court addresses this subject, the constitutionality of these programs must be divined from the Court’s 
decisions discussed below regarding employment and education affirmative action programs. 
 
Constitutional Standard For Employment Affirmative Action  
 
 The Supreme Court held in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. (1989) that state employment affirmative 
action is subject to strict scrutiny, the most exacting of all constitutional tests for evaluating discriminatory 
governmental conduct.  The Supreme Court reiterated this holding six years later in Adarand Constructors v. Pena 
(1995), and the Court has not deviated from this constitutional position.  
 
 Underlying the Supreme Court’s endorsement of strict scrutiny in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. 
(1989) is the perception that the Fourteenth Amendment is "a constitutional provision whose central command is 
equality" (Kennedy, p. 734), that ―the moral imperative of racial neutrality is the driving force of the Equal Protection 
Clause" (Scalia, p. 735) and that ―(o)ur Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among 
citizens.... " (Plessy v. Ferguson, 1896, p. 559).  As succinctly stated by Justice Sandra O’Connor (p. 493):  
 
Absent searching judicial inquiry into the justification for such race-based measures, we have no way to determine 
what classifications are “benign” or “remedial” and what classifications are in fact motivated by illegitimate notions 
of racial inferiority or simple racial politics.  We apply strict scrutiny to all racial classifications to “smoke out” 
illegitimate uses of race by assuring that (government) is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly 
suspect tool  (Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 1989). (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).   
 
 The Supreme Court has chosen strict scrutiny as the constitutional standard for evaluating employment 
affirmative action notwithstanding that equality for all classes in certain circumstances may entail unequal economic 
opportunities for some classes.  In the Court’s view, the danger of governmental discrimination against individuals on 
the basis of their race or ethnicity is greater than the danger that some classes occasionally must bear the burden of 
unequal opportunities for success (City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 1989). 
 
Constitutional Standard For Education Affirmative Action  
 
 The Supreme Court in 2003 reviewed two cases that dealt with race- and ethnic-conscious student admissions 
programs at the University of Michigan.  The Supreme Court upheld the education affirmative action plan for the 
university’s law school (Grutter v. Bollinger, 2003), but struck down on equal protection grounds the university’s 
undergraduate plan (Gratz v. Bollinger, 2003).  In each case the Court analyzes the education affirmative action in 
question using strict scrutiny.  Because of the importance of these cases to the constitutional analysis of minority 
faculty preferences, the factual background of these cases is summarized below. 
 
 In Grutter v. Bollinger (2003) the University of Michigan law school utilizes an admissions plan that is 
committed to realizing the purported educational benefits of a diverse student body.  Diversity encompasses 
consideration of myriad factors including an applicant’s race and ethnicity.  Underrepresented minorities receive a 
"plus" and their race or ethnicity is accorded ―substantial weight‖ in the admissions selection process.  Moreover, the 
law school is committed to attaining a "critical mass" of underrepresented minority students.   
 
 As a result of the foregoing admissions plan, the law school admits a number of minorities who otherwise 
would not have been allowed to enroll.  A white applicant who is denied admission sues the law school for violation 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.  The Supreme Court rejects the plaintiff’s equal protection challenge.  The Court holds 
that achieving a diverse student body is a compelling state interest and that the law school’s plan is narrowly tailored 
to achieve this interest, thereby satisfying strict scrutiny. 
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 Gratz v. Bollinger (2003) involves an undergraduate admissions program at the University of Michigan.  
Under this admissions plan, an applicant can achieve a maximum 150 points, with admission typically assured if an 
applicant received at least 100 points.  Admission criteria encompass numerous factors, including the race and 
ethnicity of an applicant.  An individual who belongs to a category of underrepresented minorities automatically 
receives 20 points and is virtually assured of admission if minimally qualified.  Two qualified white applicants who 
are denied admission at various times sue the university for violation of equal protection under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs finding that the university failed to meet its burden 
under strict scrutiny. 
 
Constitutional Standard For Minority Faculty Preferences  
 
 Strict scrutiny is the appropriate equal protection standard for evaluating minority faculty preferences since 
these preferences embody considerations common to employment and education affirmative action programs, which 
are both examined utilizing the standard of strict scrutiny.  The difficult issue is which strict scrutiny standard should 
be used: the arduous standard used for economic affirmative action or the permissive standard used for education 
affirmative action? 
 
 The answer to the foregoing equal protection query is – neither.  Neither the strict scrutiny standard for 
economic affirmative action nor the strict scrutiny standard for education affirmative action is appropriate for minority 
faculty preferences.  As explored in the remainder of this article, the strict scrutiny standard to be used for evaluating 
minority faculty preferences is a metamorphosis of the two standards now used in other economic and educational 
situations, together with a number of additional unique elements. 
 
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR CRAFTING A CONSTITUTIONAL MINORITY FACULTY 
PREFERENCE 
 
 When crafting a minority faculty preference, a university must observe several equal protection canons.  
First, every minority faculty preference is individually evaluated on a case-by-case basis for ―context matters when 
reviewing race-based governmental action under the Equal Protection Clause‖ (Grutter v. Bollinger, 2003, p. 328).  In 
addition, constitutional generalizations should not be applied to inappropriate factual situations (Gomillion v. 
Lightfoot, 1960).  Each equal protection inquiry also must consider relevant differences between various affirmative 
action programs and the situations in which they are used (Adarand Constructors, Inc. v Pena, 1995). 
 
 Applying the foregoing rules, a university must thoroughly determine and only consider facts that are 
relevant to its minority faculty preference.  A university must primarily focus on facts that relate to the current status 
and interests of the university, providing for periodic reviews to consider any changes to the status quo.  Furthermore, 
a university should both avoid rote adoption of another university’s minority faculty preference and also reject old 
data that is no longer relevant.  It is instructive for a university to heed the following words of Justice O’Connor:   
Not every decision influenced by race is equally objectionable and strict scrutiny is designed to provide a framework 
for carefully examining the importance and the sincerity of the reasons advanced by the governmental decision maker 
for the use of race in that particular context (Grutter v. Bollinger, 2003, p. 327). 
  
 Every minority faculty preference program must satisfy three general prerequisites in order to be 
constitutional under strict scrutiny.  There must be a compelling governmental interest for adopting the plan.  This 
interest must be factually established with constitutional sufficiency.  The plan must be narrowly tailored to effectuate 
the state’s compelling interest without unduly trammeling upon the rights of innocent third parties (Doe v. 
Kamehamena Schools, 2006).  These three constitutional prerequisites are discussed in order below. 
 
COMPELLING GOVERNMENTAL INTEREST AND MINORITY FACULTY PREFERENCES 
 
 Affirmative action programs as a rule are adopted in order to rectify a specific racial or ethnicity imbalance.  
The primary state interest furthered by employment affirmative action is to correct a minority underrepresentation in 
its workforce.  The primary state interest furthered by education affirmative action is to eliminate an 
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underrepresentation of minority students, in other words, to achieve a critical mass of minority students.  Minority 
faculty preferences typically aspire to further several state interests more fully discussed below.  
 
Compelling Governmental Interest And Employment Affirmative Action  
 
 The Supreme Court has recognized that a state has a compelling interest in dismantling and remedying an 
existing system of public discrimination as well as undoing the continuing effects of a prior system of discrimination 
(City of Richmond v. Croson Co., 1989).  Economic affirmative action has been approved to rectify the effects of 
discrimination in public employment (Rutherford v. City of Cleveland, 2006) as well as public contracting (W. States 
Paving Co. v. Wash. State DOT, 2005). 
 
Compelling Governmental Interest And Education Affirmative Action 
 
 ―Today, we hold that the Law School has a compelling interest in attaining a diverse student body‖ 
(O’Connor, J., Grutter v. Bollinger, 2003, p. 332). ―In summary, the Equal Protection Clause does not prohibit the 
Law School's narrowly tailored use of race in admissions decisions to further a compelling interest in obtaining the 
educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body‖ (O’Connor, J., Grutter v. Bollinger, 2003, p. 343).  With 
these two statements the Supreme Court at the same time dramatically altered equal protection jurisprudence in public 
education and created a host of questions regarding what is permitted.   
   
 The Supreme Court categorically recognizes that a university has a compelling state interest in attaining a 
―critical mass‖ of minorities in its student body (Gratz v. Bollinger, 2003).  But for what purpose must a university 
need this critical mass of minority students?   
 
 A university’s interest in having a diverse student body solely for the sake of having diversity is 
constitutionally invalid.  Justice Powell explains in Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke (1978): 
 
If petitioner's purpose is to assure within its student body some specified percentage of a particular group merely 
because of its race or ethnic origin, such a preferential purpose must be rejected not as insubstantial but as facially 
invalid.  Preferring members of any one group for no reason other than race or ethnic origin is discrimination for its 
own sake.  This the Constitution forbids.  (p. 307). 
 
 The Supreme Court explains in Grutter v. Bollinger (2003) that student diversity may be a compelling state 
interest because of the benefits it creates for students.  Such benefits include improved cross-racial communication 
and cross-cultural understanding, eradication of racial stereotypes, enhanced learning outcomes, enlivened educational 
experience, and preparation of students for leadership positions in industry, society, government, and the military.   
 
 In Grutter and Bollinger (2003), Justice O’Connor (p. 335) observes that a diverse student body furthers 
additional compelling state interests that focus more on benefits for society than on educational benefits for students.  
A diverse student body in higher education, for instance, engenders public trust that the path to leadership is 
―…visibly open to talented and qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity.‖  She further observes (p. 332-33): 
 
Access to legal education (and thus the legal profession) must be inclusive of talented and qualified individuals of 
every race and ethnicity, so that all members of our heterogeneous society may participate in the educational 
institutions that provide the training and education necessary to succeed in America.  
 
Compelling Governmental Interest And Minority Faculty Preferences 
 
 On balance, it appears that minority faculty preferences are constitutionally justified if necessary to achieve 
one or both of two compelling governmental interests.  The first interest is to undo the disadvantage that minority 
faculty candidates presently suffer due to past discrimination (Dean v. City of Shreveport, 2006).   The second interest 
is that the plan is needed to achieve a critical mass of minority faculty, which in turn is essential to actualize students’ 
education. 
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 Supreme Court decisions support the proposition that a university has a compelling interest in eradicating 
discrimination against minority faculty and in eliminating underrepresentation of minority faculty that is due to the 
university’s discrimination (Dean v. City of Shreveport, 2006).   Moreover, it is not necessary to prove that each 
beneficiary of a minority faculty preference is personally a victim of the offending university’s discriminatory 
practices (City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 1989). 
 
 The Supreme Court, on the other hand, never has held that a university has a compelling interest in attaining 
a critical mass of minority faculty, in other words, attaining a diverse faculty.  The Supreme Court explicitly 
recognizes, however, that there may be governmental interests that it has not been called upon to review and that are 
sufficiently compelling to satisfy strict scrutiny (Grutter v. Bollinger, 2003).  An extrapolation of the Supreme Court’s 
reasoning in Grutter v. Bollinger (2003) and Justice Powell’s opinion in Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke (1978) 
suggests that a university has a valid, albeit yet unacknowledged, compelling interest in having a diverse faculty 
provided that this is essential for the education of its students.  
 
 The judiciary for many years has acknowledged the importance of the American educational system and its 
unique niche in our constitutional system (Keyishian v. Board of Regents of Univ. of State of N. Y., 1967).  
Universities enjoy broad freedoms of speech and thought that emanate from the First Amendment, as well as 
educational autonomy which entitles them to select their students (Grutter v. Bollinger, 2003; Regents of Univ. of Cal. 
v. Bakke, 1978).    
 
 A persuasive argument can be made that the educational benefits that students derive from a diverse student 
body similarly flow from a diverse faculty.  Faculty, more than students, is responsible for students’ development of 
critical thinking, expansion of ethical and cultural awareness, and acquisition of knowledge.  Faculty is the primary 
impetus for motivating students to achieve and for helping them prepare for their future in business, society, and 
government.   
 
 Universities must be cognizant that the desire for a diverse faculty, in the absence of discrimination, is 
constitutionally defensible only as a means to further the growth and education of students (Regents of Univ. of Cal. 
v. Bakke, 1978).  Seeking a diverse faculty solely in order to have minority faculty, therefore, is inadequate.  
Similarly, a desire to have minority faculty so they can serve as role models for students is constitutionally infirm.  In 
addition, it is unconstitutional racial balancing for a university to seek a diverse faculty solely to reduce an historical 
underrepresentation of minority faculty or to remedy the deleterious effects of societal discrimination, such as poor 
secondary schools for many minorities. 
 
REQUISITE FACTUAL EVIDENCE AND MINORITY FACULTY PREFERENCES 
 
 A poorly defined and often contradictory aspect of equal protection analysis is the requirement that a 
university show its compelling state interest with sufficient factual evidence.   
 
Requisite Factual Evidence And Employment Affirmative Action 
 
 Economic affirmative action intended to remedy minority underrepresentation caused by discrimination must 
with ―some specificity‖ identify the discriminatory conduct and negative effects to be corrected (City of Richmond v. 
J. A. Croson Co., 1989).  This proof is required to assure that the state has a strong basis to justify using remedial 
action (Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 1986).  It also is required to enable the state to precisely devise a remedy that 
does not improperly benefit classes that have not suffered from discrimination and to minimize the harm that is caused 
to whites and nonpreferred minorities (City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 1989). 
 
 In numerous cases, economic affirmative action has been deemed unconstitutional because the state has 




Journal of Diversity Management – Third Quarter 2007 Volume 2, Number 3 
 53 
Requisite Factual Evidence And Education Affirmative Action 
 
 ―The Court defers to the Law School's educational judgment that diversity is essential to its educational 
mission‖ (O’Connor, J., Grutter v. Bollinger, 2003, p. 321).  In one sentence the Supreme Court in Grutter v. 
Bollinger (2003) effectively abdicated to a university the Court’s responsibility to assure a sufficient factual 
justification for the university’s preferential treatment of minority student applicants.  The Court indicated that its 
confidence in doing so was bolstered by certain unspecified studies, a plethora of anecdotal testimony by various 
individuals, and the presumed good faith of the university administrators (Grutter v. Bollinger, 2003). 
 
Requisite Factual Evidence And Minority Faculty Preference Plans 
 
 Traditional equal protection analysis requires a university to answer two factual inquiries in order to justify a 
minority faculty preference.  First, what factual evidence justifies the university’s need for a diverse faculty?  Second, 
what factual evidence substantiates the degree of diversity sought, in other words, the critical mass of minority faculty 
sought?  
 
 A university may establish a compelling interest in attaining a diverse faculty either by factually establishing 
its discrimination against minority faculty candidates, or by establishing its need for diversity in order to actualize the 
education of students.  Because of negative repercussions associated with a university proving its own discrimination 
against minorities, typically it is a better strategy for a university to justify its desire for a minority faculty preference 
on the compelling student educational benefits that emanate from such a plan. 
 
 Application of the Supreme Court’s deferential approach in Grutter v. Bollinger (2003) to minority faculty 
preferences demonstrates that little hard evidence is needed to establish a university’s compelling interest in attaining 
a diverse faculty.  A number of supportive studies, persuasive testimony from university administrators, and plentiful 
positive commentary from business, civic, and public officials will carry the day.   
 
 The evidence proffered to justify a minority faculty preference must be premised solely on the educational 
benefits for the students.  Other benefits articulated in Grutter v. Bollinger (2003), such as making it apparent that 
higher education is available to everyone regardless of race or ethnicity, are not applicable because they may flow 
from a minority diverse student body but not from minority faculty preferences. 
 
 Once a university establishes its compelling interest in a diverse faculty, factual evidence must be proffered 
that demonstrates the appropriate level of minority faculty and the preference that is needed to achieve this diversity.  
While the Supreme Court in Grutter v. Bollinger (2003) deferred to the judgment of university administrators 
regarding the appropriate critical mass for minority students, such deference in the context of public employment is 
improper.  
 
 Throughout its history of equal protection jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has unfailingly insisted on 
factual justification for state preferential treatment of minority employees and job applicants.   There is no reason to 
depart from this position in the context of preferential treatment of minority faculty job applicants.   
 
 Faculty are an integral part of the educational environment, but they also are individuals with their own 
compelling interests – the right to equally compete, to equally seek employment, and to equally earn a livelihood.  A 
university must be accountable if it seeks to deny this equality to faculty candidates based on their race or ethnicity, 
and it must be required to factually justify the disparate treatment it seeks to impose.  While a university may be 
entitled to deference regarding the best interests of its students, it is not entitled to the same deference regarding its 
treatment of its employees and job applicants.  In this context, the university is an employer first and an educational 
institution second, and its presumed good faith cannot supplant hard evidence.   
 
 A university can use statistical comparisons to factually justify a minority faculty preference.  To do so, a 
university first selects the appropriate faculty population to use for computing minority faculty participation.  
Utilization of aggregate figures for all minorities is overly broad. Similarly, the population used should take into 
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account variables that may affect the extent or distribution of minority faculty-student interaction, such as academic 
disciplines. 
 
 A tangential issue that bears investigation is whether the faculty population utilized should take into account 
faculty rank, tenure, and/or nature of employment contract, such as full-time or part-time.  Since the constitutional 
focus should solely be on the effect that minority faculty have on students and not on racial balancing for each of these 
criteria, this suggests that there should not be any differentiation.  This viewpoint is strengthened if, on average, 
substantially equivalent intellectual, cultural, and ethical learning and growth is realized by students from all faculty, 
regardless of rank, tenure, and nature of employment.  This question merits further investigation. 
 
 Once a university determines the faculty population to use in determining its minority faculty participation, it 
then must determine the norm or control group for minority faculty participation.  Since candidates for many faculty 
positions are recruited nationally (Chronicle of Higher Education, 2006), nationwide data for comparable minority 
faculty representation is probative.  This value generally establishes the critical mass of minority faculty that the 
university can validly expect, and it also can serve as a long-term goal for its minority faculty preference. 
 
 It is not permissible to use the racial and ethnic makeup of the general population or of the student body as a 
goal for minority faculty representation.  This approach is racial balancing and is prohibited by the Fourteenth 
Amendment (Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 1978). 
 
NARROW TAILORING OF MINORITY FACULTY PREFERENCES 
 
 The final prerequisite for a race- or ethnic-conscious affirmative plan is that it be narrowly tailored to 
accomplish its identified compelling state interest.  The Supreme Court explains that this requirement seeks to assure 
that a plan "fit with greater precision than any alternative means" (Associated Gen. Contractors v. City of San 
Francisco, 1987, p. 935), assuring "that there is little or no possibility that the motive for the classification was 
illegitimate racial prejudice or stereotype" (Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 1989, p. 721). 
 
Requisite Narrow Tailoring And Employment Affirmative Action  
 
 Narrow tailoring focuses on four factors: (1) the potential effectiveness of alternative remedies, (2) the 
flexibility and duration of the program and availability of waivers, (3) the relationship between the preference and the 
relevant labor market, and (4) the program's impact on third party rights (United States v. Paradise, 1987). 
 
 The Supreme Court stringently examines narrow tailoring in connection with economic affirmative action.  
The failure of a state to narrowly tailor a preferential plan has precipitated frequent invalidation of economic 
affirmative action plans by the courts.  
 
Requisite Narrow Tailoring And Education Affirmative Action  
 
 The Supreme Court acknowledges that the requirement of narrow tailoring applies to education affirmative 
action.  In Gratz v. Bollinger (2003), the Supreme Court struck down a preferential undergraduate admissions plan at 
the University of Michigan because it was not narrowly tailored.  The Court found that the plan failed to individually 
consider each applicant and failed to adequately assess all of the qualities of each candidate.   
 
 In contrast to its decision in Gratz v. Bollinger (2003), the Supreme Court found in Grutter v. Bollinger 
(2003) that the law school’s plan was narrowly tailored and upheld its constitutionality.  The law school plan awarded 
only a nondeterminative ―plus‖ to targeted minority candidates, and it considered myriad qualities and characteristics 
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Requisite Narrow Tailoring And Minority Faculty Preferences  
 
 A university that seeks to adopt a minority faculty preference has a host of steps that it must take in order to 
narrowly tailor its plan.   
 
 First, both prior to implementation of a minority faculty preference program and during the program’s 
duration, a university must explore using reasonable, nondiscriminatory alternatives instead of a preferential faculty 
selection process.  This topic is explored further below. 
 
 A second factor a university must include in its minority faculty preference plan is a periodic, 
comprehensive, and probing review process, as well as a flexible mechanism to adjust or terminate the program if 
warranted by changed circumstances.  Courts reviewing analogous affirmative action plans emphasize that plans 
should be short-term, perhaps with a sunset provision incorporated (Grutter v. Bollinger, 2003, p. 342). 
 
 To assure that a minority faculty preference is not overly broad, the plan should establish flexible goals that 
are regularly revisited to assure that they do not rigidly exceed what relevant statistical analyses indicate is 
appropriate.  Thus, the use of quotas, fixed percentages, or set numbers for targeted minority faculty is forbidden 
(Cavalier v. Caddo Parish Sch. Bd., 2005).  The final element in narrow tailoring requires sensitivity to the effect that 
the minority faculty preference has upon whites and nonpreferred minorities.  These innocent third parties should not 
have to bear a burden greater than reasonably necessary to effectuate the remedial purposes of a preferential plan, and 
absolute barriers to nonminority participation, such as considering only minority faculty candidates, are 
constitutionally indefensible (Britton v. South Bend Community School Corp., 1987).  
 
ALTERNATIVES TO UNIVERSITY MINORITY FACULTY PREFERENCES  
 
 The Supreme Court consistently chastises universities and other public actors to diligently explore race- and 
ethnic-neutral, i.e. ―color-blind‖, alternatives before implementing a preferential affirmative action program of any 
sort.   While a university is neither required to explore every conceivable alternative nor to first try alternatives and 
have them fail, (La Noue, G.R., 2005) it is essential that the institution make a good faith effort to investigate the 
efficacy of color-blind alternatives to fulfill its diversity goals.  
  
 Studies emanating from a variety of disciplines and a review of other relevant literature suggest two broad 
approaches for achieving a diverse faculty without extending preferential treatment to members of any racial or ethnic 
group.  One approach entails efforts by each individual university to bolster the diversity of its own faculty.  The other 
approach calls for a much more ambitious undertaking by all levels of government to eradicate fundamental systemic 
social and economic conditions that correlate with disparate rates of educational and professional success for diverse 
groups.   
 
University Efforts To Achieve Color-Blind Diversification Of Faculty  
 
 Many universities seek to offer their students a diverse faculty.  While many institutions share this common 
goal, the benefits sought from having a diverse faculty vary.  The quest for faculty diversity is sometimes justified by 
the desire to have minority faculty who can serve as role models for students of the same race or ethnicity.  The 
underlying premise, questioned by many, is that the presence of minority faculty instills in minority students the belief 
that success is possible for them as well.  Another premise is that minority faculty have a greater sensitivity than white 
faculty to the social-economic and psychological experiences and perceptions of minority students.  This perspicuity 
of minority faculty in turn enables them to better understand and assist minority students of the same race or ethnicity.  
Yet another rationale is that minority faculty serve as positive representatives of their particular race or ethnicity for 
the edification of white students.  Also, the existence of a critical mass of minority faculty may help to dispel racial 
stereotypes entertained by white students by illustrating that there is a variety of viewpoints among minorities as 
opposed to a unitary ―minority viewpoint.‖ (Kim, J.K., 2005). 
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 Educators, government officials and commentators endlessly debate and disagree on the efficacy of faculty 
diversity for achieving the foregoing educational outcomes (Long, B.T., 2003).  Notwithstanding this controversy, 
there is nothing inherently unlawful or unconstitutional about seeking or obtaining this heterogeneity.  From a legal 
point of view, the goal of diversity is not the issue, rather it is the means used to realize this end that entails judicial 
scrutiny (Taxman v. Board of Education, 1996). 
 
 A variety of sources suggest that there is an insufficient pool of certain minorities with the requisite 
education and credentials to satisfy the demand of universities across the country (Huston, T.A., 2006).  Institutions 
that seek to increase their minority faculty representation should consider the array of strategies discussed below for 
overcoming this difficulty. 
 
 The typical university that enjoys neither national fame nor fortune must often explore aggressive and 
imaginative recruitment and outreach strategies for bolstering its minority faculty.  An institution ought to consider, 
for example, expanding the venues in which it advertises for faculty beyond the Chronicle of Higher Education.  It can 
look at nontraditional sources, such as trade journals and traditionally minority-read publications.  Universities also 
may dispatch recruiters to various trade and professional meetings where they may meet and cultivate relationships 
with minority professionals who may entertain a career change to higher education. 
 
 Networking is another approach to recruiting minority faculty.  For example, a university may network with 
other colleges and universities in order to recruit their diverse students for present or future faculty openings.  Early 
recruitment of prospective faculty is particularly important given that minority students who do pursue graduate 
education disproportionately gravitate toward professional programs, such as law and medicine, and less to PhD 
programs that furnish most faculty.  A supportive program of internships and cooperative education could further 
bond these students to the particular institution enhancing its opportunity to further broaden the future diversity of its 
faculty. 
 
 A longer-term strategy for increasing minority faculty representation is for a university to create a dynamic, 
supportive relationship with local and regional K-12 programs.  First, it is particularly important for a university to 
develop close relationships with K-12 programs in lower socioeconomic regions since these areas typically include the 
greatest diversity of students.  Once these relationships are in place, a university may in turn implement a variety of 
programs that are proven to help minority students to succeed in college and to go on to pursue both professional and 
academic careers (Girves, J.E., Zepeda, Y. & Gwathmey, J.K. 2005; Maruyama, G., Burke, M., & Mariani, C., 2005).   
 
 A frequently overlooked aspect of enhanced minority faculty participation requires a university to review its 
procedures for both recruiting and retaining faculty.  It is essential that an institution assure that faculty hiring, 
promotion and tenure processes are fair to all faculty regardless of race or ethnicity, and that the standards are 
uniformly applied.  (Alger, J.R., 2000).  Are faculty applicants from historically black or minority universities, for 
instance, fairly considered alongside faculty applicants from institutions with predominantly white student 
populations?  Similarly, are faculty evaluation standards broad enough to recognize the value of publications in 
nontraditional journals and forums and the instruction of diversity courses, which frequently attract greater 
participation by minority faculty (Garry, P.M. 2005)?  Do faculty evaluations fairly evaluate all faculty regardless of 
color, or is a bias against faculty of color implicit in the instruments (Huston 2006)? 
 
 Mentoring is yet another valuable tool that a university may use to retain new faculty regardless of their race 
or ethnicity (Girves et al., 2005).  It is reported that senior faculty often take under their wing junior faculty who have 
much in common with themselves, which may inadvertently serve to unfairly isolate minority faculty (Alger, J.R., 
2000). A conscious institutional effort to extend mentoring to all faculty will help ameliorate this potential disparity.   
 
 It merits observation that before a university sets out to realize its goal of faculty diversity, it first must 
carefully and thoughtfully define what it means by diversity.  While many universities primarily define diversity in 
terms of race and ethnicity, this definition may largely miss the diversity mark for it fails to consider a plethora of 
other relevant factors that may be important to the learning and educational experience of students.  Shouldn’t 
diversity, for instance, encompass not only a person’s race and ethnicity but also his or her experiences such as 
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economic, social or physical challenges, exposure to personal adversity or tragedy, and work experience (Nadel, M. 
2006)?  While this critical issue goes beyond the parameters of this article, it seems apparent that a broader definition 
of diversity would not only be more inclusive, but it also would significantly expand the available pool for achieving a 
diverse faculty.  
 
Governmental Efforts To Facilitate Color-Blind Diversification Of Faculty  
 
 Societal discrimination refers to the diminished economic and educational opportunities that persons in lower 
socioeconomic categories experience due to inadequate housing, governmental services, and medical care, 
substandard K-12 education, and a lack of vocational training.  As a result of societal discrimination, minorities are 
frequently underrepresented in both public employment and public education.  
 
 Without expressly saying so, the Supreme Court in Grutter v. Bollinger (2003) in effect permits universities 
to use preferential admission standards to ameliorate underrepresentation of minority students that is caused in whole 
or in part by societal discrimination.  Ironically, the Supreme Court for years has forbidden public employers, such as 
universities, from using preferential programs to deal with underrepresentation of minorities in public employment 
that is caused by societal discrimination.  
 
 While government is not legally obligated to remedy the causes of societal discrimination, it is clear that 
minorities and other disadvantaged persons will continue to suffer unequal opportunities until the government until it 
does.  For instance, studies clearly indicate a correlation between the quality of a person’s K-12 education and his or 
her likelihood to succeed in higher education (Lizotte, B.N., 2006) and, concomitantly, to eventually have the 
opportunity to be college faculty.  For this reason, educators and commentators advocate improved educational and 
training opportunities for all persons from underprivileged backgrounds, regardless of their race or ethnicity.  (Dale, 




 The constitutional standard for university minority faculty preferences is strict scrutiny.  But it is a unique 
amalgamation of equal protection jurisprudence not previously seen.  
  
 This novel equal protection standard is more permissible than strict scrutiny emanating from the Supreme 
Court’s review of economic affirmative action.  The standard applicable to minority faculty preferences, for instance, 
recognizes the goal of a diverse faculty as a compelling interest even absent a history of discrimination.  This standard 
also grants universities significant latitude to craft a plan that they believe will actualize the education of their 
students.  
 
 Strict scrutiny as the standard for minority faculty preferences imposes significant restraint on universities, 
more so than in connection with student admissions.  Universities cannot arbitrarily determine the critical mass for 
minority faculty.  They cannot reserve opportunities solely for minority candidates, or unfairly skew the selection 
process in a manner that effectively excludes whites and nonpreferred minorities.  Universities also must recognize 
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